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Thomas & Wagner-Impactof ProductLiability Issues on Innovation

litigation climate in Canada, which has grown significantly, since you spoke
last time.
So I'm going to introduce Michael from Michael Wagner's bio notes here
so we don't have to pause and break the flow later. He is with the Baker
McKenzie litigation practice in Chicago, right?
MR. WAGNER: That's right.
MR. ROBINSON: Where he represents multinational companies as well
and is a specialist in defense of class actions, multidistrict litigation, and
commercial and product liability claims. Rather than spell out all these litigation successes, we will just let him describe it.
Bruce, I think you want to go first, correct?
CANADIAN SPEAKER
(Mr. Thomas has submitted a paper which is published below in its entirety.)
MEDICAL RESEARCHERS ARE ENTITLED TO PROTECTION
FROM SUIT BY LEGISLATION IN BOTH THE DOMINION OF
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Bruce A. Thomas, QC*

INTRODUCTION
This paper reviews the facts of a legal case that was commenced in Ontario against an American doctor, Dr. MS. Dr. MS was sued in her former
capacity as Chair of an important international research group. The paper
reviews the nature of the claim against Dr. MS, the duty of care owed by
researchers and the potential effects of litigation on research. Ultimately, the
author opines that there is no duty of care owed by researchers in this type of
situation. However, unless legislation is put in place to prevent these types of
. Bruce A. Thomas is a Partner at Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP. In recent years, his
primary emphasis has been on corporate and commercial related litigation. He has considerable experience in both litigating and arbitrating insurance and reinsurance coverage issues.
Bruce Thomas was appointed a Queen's Counsel in 1978. He is ranked a leading practitioner

in commercial insurance litigation in Canada by LEXPERT/American Lawyer 500 and as one
of the World's Leading Insurance & Reinsurance Lawyers by the International Financial Law

Review. He has also been named to the International Who's Who of Product Liability Defence
Lawyers.
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lawsuits, the author believes that the significant costs associated with defending these actions will ultimately have a profoundly negative impact on medical research.
THE "FACTS"
In 1995, three year old KB was diagnosed and began treatment at a Children's Hospital in Ontario, for Acute Lymphoblastic Leukemia ("ALL"). KB
was treated by the doctors and staff at the Children's Hospital pursuant to
medical Research Protocol X. KB's condition was likely fatal without aggressive treatment. KB's father, JB, signed the consent form to enrol KB in
Research Protocol X. The consent form specifically warned that the use of
methotrexate, among other life-threatening complications and side-effects,
could cause brain damage and possible death. It also stated clearly that the
clinical treatment protocol was being used for research purposes to identify,
in part, if methotrexate could be safely given at a higher dose. The consent
form also plainly indicated that other treatment options were available to
treat ALL and that those treatments were available if the patient chose not to
participate or withdrew from participation in the medical research study. The
Children's Hospital was a member institution of the research group during
the period of time KB was enrolled in Research Protocol X. The treating
physicians who treated KB at the Children's Hospital were individual members of the research group while KB was enrolled in Research Protocol X.
The plaintiffs claim in a Court action that KB suffered methotrexate toxicity, neurotoxicity, and irreversible brain damage as a result of the treatment
received, which has left her permanently disabled. Methotrexate is a commercially available prescription drug which for a long time has been in
common use for the treatment of cancer as well as other conditions. Its potential toxicity was specifically disclosed in the Research Protocol X documents as well as in the consent form. The statement of claim in the action
was issued in 2002. A claim against Dr. MS, who chaired the research group,
was issued almost three years later in 2005. Dr. MS was served with the
statement of claim ten years after KB had presented with serious side effects
from the treatment administered at Children's Hospital. Dr. MS first learned
about the existence of KB and this litigation when she was served with the
motion materials seeking to add her as a defendant.
Dr. MS: Dr. MS is a citizen of the United States. She is currently a resident in a southern state of the United States. She was elected to chair the
cooperative medical research group in 1992 and served as its Chair until
2001, when the research group merged with another group which took possession of all the research documents. During her entire tenure as Chair of
the research group, Dr. MS was resident in the State of Illinois where she
carried on her medical practise and fulfilled her research responsibilities. Dr.
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MS has never been a resident of Canada and has never practised medicine in
Canada.
THE ILLINOIS MEDICAL STUDIES ACT
Under well-established Illinois statute and case law, particularly the Illinois Medical Studies Act, Dr. MS is prohibited from disclosing, under penalty of law, any "information, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda,
recommendations, ... or other data.., used in the course of ... medical study
for the purpose of reducing morbidity or mortality.. .". The Illinois Medical
Studies Act and related case law mandate that such information is not discoverable and not admissible as evidence. The Illinois Medical Studies Act expresses a legislative intent and public policy favouring the protection and
confidentiality of information related to medical evaluation and research,
such as that related to Research Protocol X. The Illinois Medical Studies Act
mandates the confidentiality of all information generated in the course of
medical study conducted for the purpose of reducing morbidity and mortality. By this measure, any and all documents related to the development, conduct and review of Research Protocol X are covered by the Illinois Medical
Studies Act and therefore cannot be disclosed. This is true even if nondisclosure of research study related information would prohibit the plaintiffs
from prosecuting a claim involving treatment related to the medical study.
The court squarely decided this issue in Doe v. Illinois Masonic Medical
Center.2 In that case, the plaintiff, who had been enrolled in a cystic fibrosis
research protocol, sought discovery of all documents related to the research
protocol and the protocol itself.3 The defendants objected, and the court determined that the information sought was not discoverable and was privileged under the Illinois Medical Studies Act.4 "In addition to protecting all
information used in the course of 'internal quality control,' the Act's plain
language protects all information used in the course of 'medical study."' The
court concluded that the information sought was exactly the type the Illinois
Medical Studies Act covered; 5 accordingly, any and all information related to
Research Protocol X is not discoverable.
Disclosure of matters covered by the Illinois Medical Studies Act is prohibited even if disclosures prohibited under the Illinois Medical Studies Act
have been made by other witnesses in this action. Disclosure of information
covered by the Illinois Medical Studies Act does not serve as a waiver to the
confidentiality, nondiscoverability and inadmissibility of that information.

3

Doe v. Illinois Masonic Medical Center, 696 N.E.2d 707 (10 Dist. 1998).
id.

4

Id.

2

5 Id.
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Persons who disclose matters covered by the Illinois Medical Studies Act
may be prosecuted for a Class A misdemeanour under Illinois law, which
carries a minimum sentence of six months imprisonment and a maximum of
one year imprisonment.
THE RESEARCH GROUP'S OPERATIONS AND DR. MS'S
RESPONSIBILITIES AS CHAIR
The research group was a non-profit cooperative funded primarily by the
National Cancer Institute ("NCI"), and one of the American National Institutes of Health ("NIH"). Dr. MS was elected Chair of the group. This position was voluntary and not salaried. She did not receive any additional income by virtue of her position as Chair. Whilst Dr. MS was Chair, the research group had approximately 20 committees including disease committees
(e.g., New Leukemia, Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma, Brain Tumors, and Liver
Tumors), administrative committees and discipline committees (e.g., Surgical, Radiology, Pathology, Nurses, Haematology, Oncology). Each committee had a Chair who was responsible for the work of the members of the
committee.
Research protocols such as Protocol X were developed jointly by the disease committee members and the NCI, which provided oversight. (Disease
committees were constituted to conduct clinical research related to their assigned disease.) The disease committees were responsible for the design,
development, execution, analysis, and reporting of all the protocols that related to that area of research, including treatment protocols. Each year the
research groups averaged about eighty trials. Dr. MS was not an active member of any disease committee while Chair. Dr. MS was not expected to and
did not review each research protocol in detail. A number of individuals and
entities with expertise in medicine and research were responsible for the integrity, quality and correctness of the protocols. One of the most significant
participants was the NCI which is the United States Federal Government's
principal agency for cancer research and training. Other individuals and entities included the protocol coordinators, the study coordinators, the disease
committee members and chairs, the statistical office, the Data and Safety
Monitoring Committee (as described later on in this article), the executive
officer, and the local member institutions. Membership of a hospital in the
research group was voluntary, but each institution was required to meet standards of quality and expertise in the treatment of cancer in children. This
included having specialists who would oversee the research being conducted
at the institution under the research group sponsored protocols. Participation
in any particular protocol by any individual member institution or its medical
staff was also voluntary. Research protocols had to be approved for scientific merit and patient safety by the NCI before they could be issued and be-
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fore patients could be enrolled in them. As part of the approval process, NCI
guidelines required that the research group submit a model patient informed
consent for each protocol to NCI for approval. If approved by NCI, the
model consent was ultimately sent to the local participating institutions,
along with protocol activation materials. Local participating institutions
could further modify the consent form to customize it to the needs of their
own institutions.
Clinical research involves monitoring for therapeutic effects as well as
adverse effects of the therapy being studied. Since leukemia is a deadly disease if untreated and chemotherapy agents are highly toxic, adverse effects
are unavoidable. Indeed, the reason for Research Protocol X was that existing
treatment regimens were unsuccessful in achieving complete remission in all
cases and so some percentage of children continued to die from the disease.
Research Protocol X described in detail the potential adverse events associated with each of the chemotherapy agents used in the treatment. For methotrexate, the drug at issue, the protocol document described adverse events
ranging from nausea to progressive central nervous system deterioration
leading to death.
Research protocols included provisions for the reporting of adverse events
associated with the treatment so that the risks and benefits of the therapy
being studied could be evaluated systematically and scientifically. The Data
Safety Monitoring Committee ("DSMC") was primarily responsible for
monitoring adverse events. All adverse events associated with the treatment
were gathered and reviewed twice a year by the DSMC to determine if the
therapy is adequately tolerated or needed modification. Dr. MS was not a
member of the DSMC that reviewed safety information on a semi-annual
basis from the protocols, nor did she have access to the data provided to the
DSMC. In accordance with NCI guidelines, the DSMC operated entirely
independently and beyond the control of Dr. MS. Research Protocol X, including the description of the toxicity of the agents at issue, was supplied to
Children's Hospital as a member institute of the research group. In order for
the member institution to enroll patients under the protocol, the institution's
ethics board or Institutional Review Board ("IRB") had to approve the protocol. The IRB at Children's Hospital did approve this study.
ARGUABLY THERE IS NO CAUSE OF ACTION IN LAW AGAINST
DR. MS
Public policy should negate a legal cause of action from being imposed on
Dr. MS. The allegation against Dr. MS is that she was negligent with respect
to the design, development, implementation, management, and administration of Research Protocol X in which the minor Plaintiff, KB, was enrolled.
She is also alleged to be vicariously liable for the actions of others who par-
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ticipated in Research Protocol X. However, it is submitted that under Canadian or American law, Dr. MS owed no legal duty of care towards the plaintiffs and that the action against her cannot succeed because her role in connection with the design and development of this protocol was indirect and
administrative in nature.
CANADIAN LAW ON THE DUTY OF CARE
Duty of care in negligence is based upon the existence of a relationship of
proximity between parties and foreseeability that the actions of one will affect the other, and is subject to considerations of public policy which may
negate the imposition of a duty. The test for determining the duty of care in
Canada was most recently articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Cooper v. Hobart, as follows:
In brief compass, we suggest that at this stage in the evolution of the law,
both in Canada and abroad, the Anns analysis is best understood as follows.
At the first stage of the Anns test, two questions arise: (1) was the harm that
occurred the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's act? And
(2) are there reasons, notwithstanding the proximity between the parties established in the first part of this test, that tort liability should not be recognized here? The proximity analysis involved at the first stage of the Anns test
focuses on factors arising from the relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant. These factors include questions of policy, in the broad sense of
that word. If foreseeability and proximity are established at the first stage,
primafacie duty of care arises. At the second stage of the Anns test, the ques-

tion still remains whether there are residual policy concerns outside the relationship of the parties that may negative the imposition of a duty of care. It
may be, as the Privy Council suggest in Yuen Kun Yeu, that such considerations will not often prevail. However, we think it useful expressly to ask, be-

fore imposing a new duty of care, whether despite foreseeability and proximity of relationship,
there are other policy reasons why the duty should not
6
be imposed.

Neither of the branches of the Anns test, as articulated by the Supreme

Court of Canada, are met. First, the risks were apparent to the participants in
Research Protocol X, including the parents of the infant plaintiff KB, as reflected by the signed consent form. Moreover, given the various checks and
balances in place with respect to the design and implementation of Research
Protocol X, it was not foreseeable that there would be defects in the protocol
which would result in harm. Given the fact that the protocol was designed,
Cooper v. Hobart, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537 (Can.) (quoting Anns v. Merton London Borough
Council, [1978] A.C. 728 (H.L.)).
6

Thomas & Wagner-Impactof ProductLiability Issues on Innovation

developed and reviewed by experts on the New Leukemia Committee, approved by the NCI and accepted and approved by the local institutions where
patients were enrolled, it would not be reasonable to expect Dr. MS to be
accountable for the actions of others. Second, there was no proximate relationship between Dr. MS and the plaintiffs. The test for proximity was described by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hercules Managements Ltd. v.
Ernst & Young, as follows:
...The label 'proximity', as it was used by Lord Wilberforce in Anns, supra
was clearly intended to connote that the circumstances of the relationship inhering between the plaintiff and the defendant are of such a nature that the defendant may be said to be under an obligation to be
mindful of the plaintiffs
7
legitimate interests in conducting his or her affairs.
The factors which are relevant in considering the proximity requirement
depend on the circumstances in each case. These can include the expectation
of the parties, representations, reliance and the nature of the property or interest involved. There was not the necessary close and direct relationship that
would justify imposing a duty of care on Dr. MS to the plaintiffs. She made
no representation that would have been relied upon by the plaintiff and neither could there have been any reasonable expectation on the part of the
plaintiffs that Dr. MS would act so as not to create any risk of harm to them.
In a situation such as this, a patient suffering from a potentially fatal disease
being treated by recognized medicines which were potentially toxic, by
highly trained personnel, it is not reasonable to expect an administrator of the
research group, who was not involved in the design, development or implementation of the protocol in question to be accountable for an undesirable
outcome.
In Hughes v. Sunbeam Corporation, the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a claim by the purchaser of an allegedly defective smoke alarm
against a company that was the tester and endorser of the product. The court
held that the plaintiff could not establish a primafacie duty of care. As was
stated by Laskin J.A.:
Two main considerations suggest that the proximity requirement has
not been met. First, an independent tester and endorser, like ULC, approves products for the benefit of the entire public. By doing so, it encourages manufacturers to design and build their products safely. But
it does not undertake responsibility to protect individual homeowners
from economic loss if a product it has approved turns out to be defective. Second, it hardly seems fair and just to permit an individual who
7 Hercules Managements Ltd. v. Ernst & Young, [19971 2 S.C.R. 165 (Can.).
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has not paid for a valuable service like testing to sue the tester when
the service is negligently performed. For these reasons, Hughes' negligence claim against ULC does not pass the first stage of the Anns test.
Proximity has not been established. Therefore, no duty of care exists.8
The research activities in question benefit society generally by advancing
medical science and trying to find cures for cancer by performing research
relating to various forms of paediatric cancer. The research group should not
be liable. Even more so, an individual such as Dr. MS who was an administrative officer of the research group should not be liable. Just like ULC, neither the research group nor Dr. MS were paid by the plaintiffs or anyone else
for this research. Just like ULC, it would be unfair to permit someone in the
shoes of the plaintiffs to sue either the research group or Dr. MS. It is submitted that there is no basis for finding the "close and direct" relationship necessary to grounding a duty of care. Moreover, under the second branch of the
Anns test, it is clear that the research group's work and the work of its members in researching cures and treatments for children's cancers is of such
importance to society as a whole that no duty should be imposed upon Dr.
MS for policy reasons. The policy considerations at issue relate to concerns
about the effect of recognizing a duty of care upon the legal system and upon
society more generally. It would not be fair, just or reasonable to impose a
duty upon Dr. MS in the individual circumstances of this case. Individual
researchers and research cooperative groups and their officers operate for the
collective welfare of society to advance medicine and science and the imposition of liability would impair their ability to conduct these sorts of activities, and chill medical research.
While there is no precedent for imposing liability on voluntary research
organizations or on their administrative officers, the following few cases are
instructive. For example, in Marc Rich & Co. v. Bishop Rock Marine Co.
Ltd. et al., the issue before the English House of Lords was whether liability
to cargo owners could be imposed upon a "classification society" in respect
of the investigation and recommendations made by one of its surveyors. 9
Classification societies supervise the construction of ships and conduct periodic surveys to ascertain whether they are entitled to retain a particular classification for safety purposes. Classification societies are also called in to
survey damage to ships and to determine what repairs must be done to retain
a classification. Thus, the responsibility is primarily to ship owners, al8 Hughes v. Sunbeam Corporation (Canada) Limited et al., [2002], 51 O.R. (3 rd) 433
(C.A.) at 437 (Can.), leave to appeal refused, [2003], 320 N.R. 193n (S.C.C.) (Can.).
9 Marc Rich & Co. v. Bishop Rock Marine Co. Ltd. et al., [1996], 1A.C. 211 (H.L.), at
241-242 (Can.).
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though, as a practical matter, a society does have control over the question of
whether a damaged vessel should be allowed to complete a voyage.
The question posed was whether the classification society owed a duty of
care to a third party, the cargo owners, arising from the allegedly careless
performance of a survey of a damaged vessel by the surveyor which resulted
in the vessel being allowed to sail whereupon it sank. 10 The English House of
Lords was prepared to accept that the elements of foreseeability and proximity could be shown, but it rejected the imposition of a duty of care on the
ground that it was not fair, just and reasonable to do so in the circumstances
because the classification society was an independent and non-profit making
entity created and operated for the sole purpose of promoting the safety of
lives and ships at sea, fulfilling a role which would otherwise have been performed by government. 1 To impose a duty of care would ultimately shift the
attendant risk from ship owners, and this would disturb the balance created
by the international rules under which the system of cargo transportation
operated. It might also lead the classification society to adopt a more defensive position which would be contrary to the public interest.
In Canada, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Elliott v. Insurance Crime
Prevention Bureau dismissed an action against individuals and companies
who investigated and reported on a fire which destroyed the plaintiffs' home,
as a result of which the insurer denied coverage.1 2 The plaintiffs succeeded
against the insurer on the policy but were denied general damages for inconvenience and mental distress, aggravated damages and punitive and exemplary damages.1 3 It was these damages which they sought in the subsequent
action against the investigators and adjustors.' 4 The court held that while the
risk of harm was foreseeable, and that there was a sufficient relationship of
proximity between the investigators and the plaintiffs, policy reasons dictated
that the action be dismissed as against them. 15 The following quote demonstrates their reasoning:
In the present case, two main policy considerations show that it would be unwise
to recognize the duty of care proposed by the appellants. First, persons in the appellants' situation have their contractual remedy on the policy, which remedy includes,
in a proper case, a claim for aggravated and punitive damages. While this remedy
will not always be complete for persons in the appellants' situation, it is a substantial
and meaningful remedy making the case for some new form of liability less compelling than it would absent such a remedy. Second, imposing the proposed duty would
10 Id.
11 Id.

12 Elliott v. Insurance Crime Prevention Bureau, [2005], 256 D.L.R. (4th) 674 (N.S.C.A.)
(Can.).
13 Id.
14

id.
15 Id.
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distort the legal relationships among the insurer, the insured and the investigators and
could potentially undermine the ability of the insured and the insurer to properly deal
with insurance claims... 16
The court should guard against creating, indirectly, an insurance scheme
in respect of which the plaintiffs have paid nothing. They have recourse, if
warranted, against the hospital and the treating physicians. Medical researchers as a group operate for the collective welfare of society to advance medicine and science. The imposition of liability will impair their ability to conduct these sorts of activities, particularly since they will not likely be able to
adequately protect themselves by way of waivers, indemnities or insurance.
It is submitted that the Canadian law would hold that the research group
owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs. The medical research group in question and the administrative officers who served were volunteers who had no
profit motives. Their sole interest was in the successful treatment of cancer in
children and relieving the misery it brings to all those affected by it. The research group's activities were not only motivated by a desire for social good
but also were monitored by the American Government's agency, the NCI, to
which it was accountable.
AMERICAN LAW ON DUTY OF CARE
It is submitted that American law would not recognize a legal duty of care
in circumstances such as these. In Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California, a California court addressed whether a doctor has a duty to protect third parties from the actions of his patient. 17 The court found that there
are eight factors in determining whether a duty exists:
1. the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff;
2. the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury;
3. the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct
and the injury suffered;
4. the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct;
5. the policy of preventing future harm;
6. the burden on the defendant of imposing a duty;
7. the public consequences of the existence of a duty; and
8. the availabilityof insurancefor the risk involved.18
Applying the principles enunciated in this case, the following conclusions
can be drawn. First, Dr. MS had no direct contact with the plaintiffs and any
16
17
18

Id. at 703-709.
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
id.
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connection between them was remote and attenuated. Dr. MS rendered no
care to KB nor was she consulted about KB's care. Dr. MS had no control
over those that conducted the multiple layers of review and certification for
Research Protocol X and had no control over the physicians who determined
and provided the treatment for KB at Children's Hospital. Moreover, it is
submitted that under American law, Dr. MS's actions or inactions cannot be
said to be the proximate cause of KB's injuries. The dissent in Palsgrafv.
Long Island Railroad Co., offers a number of factors to consider when determining "proximate cause", including:
whether the sequence of events between the act and the harm was
natural and continuous;
whether the natural consequence of the act was to produce the harm, or
whether there is attenuation between the act and the harm;
the closeness or remoteness in time and space of the act to the harm;
whether most people would consider the harm to be a result of the act
alleged; and,
whether the harm could have been foreseen by the actor. 19
Second, the cost of imposing a duty, the hindrance of continued medical
research, outweighs the justification of imposing a duty. To further expand
this review process to include the imposition of tort liability would discourage research efforts since, if Dr. MS is found to owe a duty of care in this
action, then a duty of care would also certainly be imposed on the NCI,
committee chairs and the study coordinators, among others. If this were to
occur, researchers would be busy defending lawsuits to which they have no
direct connection instead of doing research. In Moore v. Regents of the University of California,the Supreme Court of California warned of the adverse
effect that the unnecessary expansion of tort liability would have on medical
research.2 ° In Moore, the plaintiff sued for conversion after the defendant
doctor took parts of the plaintiff's person removed in surgery and used them
for medical research without his knowledge. 21 The court, found that the tort
of conversion had never been applied in the medical context, and determined,
primarily in reliance upon policy considerations, that the policy rationale
"that we not threaten with disabling civil liability innocent parties who are
engaged in socially useful activities, such as22researchers" outweighed the
patient's right to assert a claim for conversion.

19 Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
20 Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479,493 (Cal. 1990).
21

Id.

22

id.
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Third, the burden of imposing a duty on Dr. MS would be onerous. To
single out Dr. MS among the many who participated in the creation, development, implementation, review and approval of Protocol X would be an
undue hardship on Dr. MS.
Fourth, there can be no moral blame attached to Dr. MS's conduct. She
had no financial incentive to accept the position as Chair of the research
group nor to participate in the administration of the research cooperative
group which produced Research Protocol X. Nor did Dr. MS have any right
to profit from Research Protocol X upon its completion or if it was successful.
Numerous safeguards were in place to protect those that were treated in
accordance with research protocols. The protocol was subject to appropriate
review. Further, the foreseeable risks associated with the protocol were
plainly outlined in the protocol documents supplied to the doctors treating
KB and the protocol's consent form, signed by the parents. Intervening acts
and duties may in themselves alleviate the liability of a negligent actor. In
such cases, there is a break in the natural chain of consequences which overrides the concept of foreseeability. Dr. MS cannot be said to be the proximate
cause of KB's injuries. Moreover, as was stated in Spenceley v. M.D. Anderson Cancer Center: "Research is not treatment. Experiments require measurements and conditions that may not be therapeutically significant.... Research is no standard; it is speculation, approximation and inquiry., 23 Research Protocol X was used as a method of treating KB but the purpose of the
protocol was for research, the advancement of science and the benefit of
medical treatment as a whole. The research aspect was disclosed in the consent form.
It is submitted that under American law, Dr. MS owed no duty of care
towards the plaintiffs, since arguably the learned intermediary doctrine applies in these circumstances. Under the learned intermediary doctrine in the
medical context, a duty owed to a patient can be fulfilled by adequately informing the patient's physician of the risks and benefits of a product (or in
this case, a treatment protocol). The treating physician is in a better position
to convey those risks and benefits of the treatment protocol.
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Moreover, it is submitted that under either Canadian or American law, Dr.
MS cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of other members of the
research group. Vicarious liability is typically ascribed to employers whose
employees commit torts during the course of their employment or if there is
23

Spenceley v. M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, 938 F. Supp. 398, 398 (S.D. Tex. 1996)

(emphasis added).
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an agency relationship between the parties. Dr. MS's role was not that of an
employer, nor were the professionals who worked within the research group,
her agents.
MEDICAL RESEARCH SHOULD BE EXEMPT FROM CLAIMS FOR
PUBLIC POLICY REASONS
Public policy, both in Canada and the United States, encourages medical
research to find effective cures and treatment for cancer and other diseases.
This public policy was achieved in this situation in part by American government funding through the NCI and by the research group. To expose individual researchers and administrators, who are subject to external oversight
and who are not in any way connected to the medical treatment of an individual patient, to liability in tort would discourage and inhibit cancer research efforts and is contrary to such public policy. Claims such as that
against Dr. MS in the circumstances of this case, will have a profoundly
negative impact on medical research.
Researching cures and treatments for children's cancers is of such importance to society as a whole that those who administer such research programs
should not be required to defend claims where the end research may be used
or incorporated into health care systems unless they are directly involved in
the treatment of the injured patient. The policy considerations at issue relate
to concerns about the effect that recognizing a duty of care owed by pure
researchers would have on the legal system in terms of the relationships between the parties, and on medical research which benefits society more generally. Those who serve as Chair or in other capacities in research groups
operate for the collective welfare of society to advance medicine and science.
The potential for liability would impair their ability to conduct these sorts of
beneficial activities, and would chill or significantly undermine those who
pursue medical research purely for the advancement of medical treatment of
cancer and other life threatening diseases. This is more so in this instance,
where substantial governmental and children's hospital institutional safeguards were in place to protect the plaintiffs from protocol defects, and
where the consent form signed by the plaintiffs clearly presented the risks
involved in participating in the protocol at issue.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that research is adversely affected and innovation is stifled
if researchers can be sued. While the common law and legislation such as the
Illinois Medical Studies Act appear to provide some measure of protection for
researchers such as Dr. MS, it is submitted that more specific legislation is
needed to shield persons in her position who are engaged in research pro-
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jects, particularly those with a therapeutic objective, from the distraction, the
time and expense needed to defend civil court actions.
UNITED STATES SPEAKER
t
Michael J. Wagner

First, thanks for having me. My firm was involved in the first constitutional challenge to that statute. As you can imagine, it was pretty controversial. In 1983, one of my partners sought to withhold documents from disclosure in litigation for precisely the kind we just heard Bruce talking about,
documents related to classic peer review, analysis of performance of a research trial, analysis of performance of physicians within the context of their
licensure and their work.
The suit involved a very well-financed, influential and creative plaintiffs
lawyer. We have elected judges whose campaigns require replenishment
every ten years or eight years. One of those plaintiffs lawyers brought it to
one of the judges and said this statute is unconstitutional, and we are being
deprived of our due process rights to know what the hospital said about the
performance of this particular group of doctors. To my partner's unpleasant
surprise the judge agreed that it was unconstitutional, prompting us to take it
up for an appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, where
we succeeded in hav24
ing the ruling reversed and the statute was upheld.
Why is that important here? Well, if innovation means anything, it means
that the physicians, for example, who are the clinical investigators in research
trials, can innovate in a way that allows them to be critical of not just the
medication under consideration but also of the performance of each other in
the way they administrator it and the way they develop it. So that is classic
peer review and very important for our purposes today. It remains a vital
statute in Illinois, but it is under siege every year. 25 You will see some cases,
1 Michael J. Wagner is a in Baker & McKenzie LLP Litigation Practice Group where he
represents multinational companies engaged in litigation alleging breach of contract, product
liability, fraud, misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of fiduciary duty and executive disloyalty, tortious interference with contract and commercial disparagement. Mr. Wagner regularly has primary counsel responsibility for the defense of class actions and multi-district
litigation involving commercial and product liability claims. He frequently defends global
manufacturers as they confront mass tort and other litigation involving products ranging from
prescription medications and vaccines to medical devices to food. He also represents software
developers, project managers and IT consultants in commercial disputes.
24 Jenkins v. Wu, 468 N.E.2d 1162 (I11.Sup. Ct. 1984).
25 See, e.g., Ardisana v. Northwest Community Hosp., Inc., 795 N.E.2d 964 (I11.App. Ct.
1st Dist. 2003) (involving a partially successful challenge to a portion of the Medical Studies

